What WAI does
Every capability in the standard, area by area, as of : checked against commit 498e6b889 of the open-standards repository's main branch, whose repository checks passed on the forge (run 35635, 2026-11-15). Each one links the text that specifies it and the conformance that checks it: a corpus, its independent verifier or the workflow that runs them. Everything here is in that repository, under Apache-2.0. waiTransport, the commercial product built on it, has its own site.
The core and its profiles
The core, the part of WAI that has stopped moving, is core 1.0 at 498e6b889: the envelope, the manifest, capability dispatch, the model pin, receipts and the determinism tiers, pinned item by item in the repository and frozen. It was declared on 2026-11-15 from candidate 3, and changes only by an erratum or a raised core version. Everything else is a profile with a version of its own, and every extension is in exactly one profile or wholly in the core (Conformance Results).
Envelope, dispatch and registry
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single-payload envelope, manifest and capability dispatch with a declared fallback. A sink without the capability reports the file inert. | A fallback decodes the same payload; alternate content travels as renditions. | ||
| Reader limits: a reader may not refuse a manifest for its length, its nesting or its number of values up to 128 MiB, 127 levels deep and 2²² values, and may refuse a longer, deeper or larger one: a longer one from its length field alone, before it reads or requests it, and one with more values while it counts them, before it builds anything from the manifest. A zstd or xz text payload has limits of its own: 128 MiB decoded, and 128 MiB of history its decoder must keep. So do pictures (65 536 pixels on a side and 2²⁷ in all), audio (2²⁷ samples counting every channel) and AV1 (2²⁰ temporal units of such pictures), refused from what the payload declares before it is decoded, and the extension formats' declared durations: a score, haptic signal or audio scene renders at most 2²⁷ samples, and a splat4d clip, film or reel at most 2²⁰ frames. The reference readers refuse past every limit, and the reference writers refuse to write past them; tests measure the memory a parse and a decode take, at each limit and one past it. | Replaying a world to a far tick is bounded in memory, not in time. | ||
| Multi-rendition envelope, with companion descriptors for HDR metadata. | Every rendition ships in the envelope and the deployer sets the selection policy. | ||
| Companion conformance rules, and an enhancement layer bound to exactly one base rendition in the same envelope. | The sink supplies the enhancement decoder; the registry records its licence class. | ||
| Capability constraint sets, evaluated before dispatch. | A web page evaluates them itself, as the browser sink extension's section 5 states. | ||
| Mandatory floor (PNG, FLAC, zstd) for every sink; the video floor, AV1 in its Main profile at level 4.1 and below, for every sink that presents video; and a recommended set. A floor suite holds a decoder to each: one case for each mandatory-floor capability, and an AV1 stream with the digest of every decoded frame. | A sink that only stores, forwards or inspects envelopes presents no media class, so the video floor does not hold it. | ||
| The model a neural payload needs is named, pinned by digest and never carried in the envelope; a mismatch is refused. A pinned prior can declare its artifact's wire form, and the NNC bitstream is registered as one. | A replicate whose prior declares a wire form the sink cannot read is refused. | ||
| A licence class for each capability in the codec registry, queryable in code. | The deployer enforces it. | ||
| Determinism tiers — entropy-consistency and decode-equivalence — typed in code, with replicate meaning exactly what its tier guarantees. | Decode-equivalence is shown on native CPU, on WebAssembly, and on GPUs for a decoder's wai-ops/1-i32 graphs, on each adapter and backend the extension lists, where a run reproduced every graph vector the subset covers; on each of them but the browser's WebGPU, the integer codecs' committed vectors also decoded with their graphs on the device to the bytes of the decode on the CPU. A decoder's stage operators, and a graph with an operator outside the subset, stay on the CPU. The tier never covers output a sink cannot read. | ||
| Broadcast and streaming codec registrations, each licence-classified and never a default. | The reference implementation carries them through the envelope; the sink's own libraries decode them. | ||
| Derived tracks: derivation operations over decoded samples as capabilities, each with a stated determinism tier. | — | ||
| Versioning: the container is frozen for all of 1.x, and the manifest schema is frozen for 1.x in a stated sense: no member is removed, renamed, retyped or made required, and an optional member may be added. A registered capability's payload format is fixed; a registration completed later is fixed from the revision that completes it. | A Draft Standard. This revision makes one exception to the freeze: a member it defines, carried with another JSON type, makes the manifest malformed rather than ignored. | ||
| The core: the envelope, the manifest, capability dispatch, the model pin, receipts and the determinism tiers, with the floors and the conformance suites that hold them, named in CORE.md and pinned item by item by SHA-256. A change to a core item passes only as an erratum that changes no meaning, or with the core version raised; the repository checks refuse anything else on every change. Everything outside the core is a profile with a version of its own, and every extension is in exactly one profile or wholly in the core. | Core 1.0, declared on 2026-11-15 from candidate 3: a change of meaning raises the core version. |
Codecs and evidence
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Integer learned image codecs, integer inter-frame video with half-pel motion, video with a learned integer keyframe, integer learned audio, and an integer splat codec. | Conformance requires byte-identical output. | ||
| wai.neural.int_mlicpp: the MLIC++ entropy topology, integer end to end. | Two conformance vectors: one with synthetic weights, which states no quality figure, and a set trained on openly licensed natural pictures, whose bits, quality, decode time and energy on named hosts are each a dated record. | ||
| JPEG AI exact decoder: an integer entropy stage, then reconstruction in a fixed evaluation order with no platform maths library. Its output is pinned, and CI runs the whole decode. | The configurations of its model that determinism tiers section 5 names: 8-bit 4:4:4 pictures whose sides are 128, 192 or 256, each tool on or off; any other codestream is refused. The capability is registered at entropy-consistency; the pinned reconstruction is a property of the exact decoder under its stated build conditions. | ||
| Quality evidence for the integer learned image codec: the integer decode is held to a bar against the same model's float decode. | Held to within 1 dB of the float decode on a pinned photograph. | ||
| Fast integer decode kernels that give the same integer for every output, with a throughput note. | Timed on one machine. WebAssembly runs the same kernels single-threaded, untimed. | ||
| Bounded, machine-checked proofs over the integer rANS core. | The text lists what is proved. | ||
| Exact upscale: super-resolution as an exact derivation. A sink presents a picture at twice or four times its size by a pinned upscale plus a detail an integer network computes from the picture, under a prior it holds by its SHA-256, every operation one of the integer operator set's, so every sink presents the same bytes and anyone holding the picture and the prior recomputes them. An origin can send a residual against that upscale and sign the bound within which the output lies. A sink's presentation statement accounts for each picture it presented as transmitted, derived, asserted or synthesized, with its pixels counted, and a verifier refuses an upscale claimed as captured. | The priors are trained in floating point from fixed seeds; their bytes are what is pinned. | ||
| Encoders. | Classical encoding in the command-line tool. The learned and integer encoders are offline tools. |
Instruction cargo
Content carried as state or instructions and rebuilt at the sink.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Worlds (scene, replay, live), film (linear, reel), feeds, avatar pose, spatial audio scenes, score, haptics and 4D splats. | Conformance covers state, samples or per-frame identity, with a conformance corpus per class; the render belongs to the sink. A binaural render is perceptual and declares its metric. | ||
| World model. | Conformance covers the action trace, not the frames. | ||
| Model generations: a signed generation record states one run of an open-weights world or video generator on a party's own machine in WAI's terms: its weights by a pin and its source by a listing in the same form, its inputs as a world-model action trace whose header binds the model, the seed and the frame geometry, and its frames under the world model's frame receipt and as the subject of an origin claim of generation. A verifier checks every binding, so a weight file that is not the pinned one, a trace that names another model or seed, and a frame edited after the generation are each refused with a reason of its own. | A floating-point generator claims no determinism tier: the record states each further run of the same inputs with the frames it gave, so a reader sees whether a host reproduced it. | ||
| Deterministic spectral generation. Its payload is an instruction object (form v0): one canonical JSON object that names the model by its SHA-256 and gives the prompt, the seed, the steps and every size a sink makes. A sink makes only the listed sizes, with that model only, and checks each picture by its SHA-256. The command-line tool makes pictures from these objects and writes them (wai generate), and builds and renders scores from integer note fields (wai score). | A sink refuses a payload that is not the object's one serialization, and makes nothing from it. It may decline a listed size it cannot afford. | ||
| Generated pictures and scores made in the browser from their instructions, every byte checked against the SHA-256 the native reference wrote, a mismatch refused, and measured beside the same pieces as files. | Three pictures at four sizes and five scores, counted in the tab. A recording, such as the film excerpt, cannot travel this way. | ||
| Live world operations: a relay verifies each signed operation, and late joiners re-derive the world. | A late joiner replays the full log. A room has a fixed capacity. |
Delivery workflow
The attested on-demand and channel workflow: wai.video.manifest, .ssai, .keys, .package and .channel; and wai.delivery.settlement, delivery paid on what the party that received it signed.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Session-class manifest: an HLS media playlist generated once per session class. | The signer declares the viewer count behind any per-viewer figure. | ||
| Ad-insertion decisions with per-impression receipts. | A verifier rejects a record whose spend exceeds the grant's funds ceiling. | ||
| Key-release decision records: every release and every refusal is a signed receipt. | Records decisions; speaks no licence protocol. | ||
| Packaging: segmentation on group-of-pictures boundaries into content-hashed segments. | The caller supplies the slices. A verifier recomputes the deduplication totals from the signed entries. | ||
| Virtual linear channel: attested playback windows chained into a record of what aired. | — | ||
| Settlement: the party downstream of a delivery, a next hop or a sink, signs an acknowledgement of the objects it received in a window, by content hash, with their byte ranges and byte count. A hop whose downstream will not or cannot sign declares the delivery itself, in a class of its own: never as zero and never billed. A byte-range proof shows that given bytes are a range of an object without the rest of it. A retrieval below the live edge, from a recording or past a cache is billed only to a grant whose proof of possession the request carried. A settlement statement, per party and period, states the acknowledged bytes by object class, the party's joules by acquisition class, never summed across classes, and the amount under a declared tariff; a verifier recomputes every figure from the acknowledgements. Each acknowledged item of an HTTP delivery maps onto an RFC 7937 logging record, and a log maps only onto declarations: no log field is signed by the party that received the bytes. | No payment rail and no money. Open caching logs (SVTA2050) are mapped through the RFC 7937 fields they carry. | ||
| Price documents: a publisher's signed statement of the prices of the endpoints it routes to, each price a numerator per divisor of a named unit for the window it holds, with the terms a router's limits read and the model weights each endpoint runs, by digest and licence. A split rule in a closed vocabulary divides the entries into a public part and the rest, which the signed document holds only as a salted commitment; the public view and the full view verify to the document's one digest. A verifier holds a route record's price book, or any price stated as the publisher's, to a view at an instant. | — |
Carriage
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Media over QUIC, under the MOQT Streaming Format: the packaging value "wai", catalog capability fields, and an optional per-object WAI_RECEIPT property that names the figure's acquisition class. | Tracks IETF Internet-Drafts. Each object is one whole single-payload envelope. An energy claim carries an object's class under a signature. | ||
| Unidirectional delivery. | A receipt sent over a bearer with no return path attests what was published, never what was received: the publisher declares the bearer beside it, and a sink's reconciliation, signed later and out of band, attests what the sink received. | ||
| Bearer receipts: one receipt on every bearer. A group's receipts are the same bytes over a two-way relay chain, multicast or a broadcast bearer with no return path. Beside them, the publisher's transmission claim declares the bearer and attests transmission, never delivery, and a sink's reconciliation claim attests the objects it received by a root under the group's own tree, checked against the publisher's root without the objects. A verifier gives each group published, transmitted or reconciled, and a statement that a group was delivered to a number of sinks holds only when that many keys reconciled every object. A shared transmission's energy per receiver is an upper bound that tightens as reconciliations arrive, never a measurement. A sink with no return path confirms keys only under anchors provisioned in advance. | The mappings onto broadcast and multicast bearers are normative for the bytes WAI controls and informative for the bearers' own protocols, each at the edition read. |
Edge
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relay preservation: forward envelopes and receipts byte for byte, with no transcoding, rewriting or re-signing. A relay that reads the receipts it forwards fans out an object only once a signed statement it verified covers it: the group's receipt, or another class the registry admits, such as a running receipt its owner signed for that one object while the group grows. | A relay attests in a separate, parallel receipt. | ||
| A transform recorded as its own signed lineage step. | — | ||
| A deriving edge: an edge evaluates a derived-tracks operation over decoded samples, rebuilds an object at a lower rung for a sink that lacks its capability (a frame of an integer motion clip as a PNG still or a JPEG picture), or re-packages one without re-encoding it. Each output is a new object, published under the edge's own receipts with a signed derivation record that chains it to its source. When every step is pinned, any verifier holding the inputs re-executes the hop and compares the output byte for byte; otherwise the hop is attested, and a sink's policy may refuse it. A sink follows its object hop by hop back to the publishers it subscribed to. Each record carries forward, by digest, every provenance item its inputs had, and an AI-origin label that no hop may lower. | An edge alters nothing it received. |
Live rooms
Rooms where several people publish and many watch, over Media over QUIC and the protocols standard encoders and players speak. Each record is signed, and a verifier replays it.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rooms: a signed room descriptor, whose digest is the room id, fixes the room's authority, its clock, the roles a principal may hold and what each may do, its limits, its publish profiles and its review and recording policies. A signed room grant, under which one principal takes part, carries its capabilities, a window of at most fourteen days, the event policy it is held to and its joule and funds ceilings. A grant is exchanged at a tick of the room clock and revoked through the key log; it maps onto existing token formats, and is honoured only beside a proof that the presenter holds its key. A room verifier replays every principal's events under the grant in effect at each instant. | How a principal obtains a grant, and how a ceiling is held while a session runs, are the deployment's. Several of its bindings follow Internet-Drafts, which may still change. | ||
| Live events: timed metadata, ad and chapter cues, chat, reactions, polls, markers, remote-control commands, captions, moderation decisions and room lifecycle, each one record signed by its principal, hash-chained to that principal's previous event and stamped with the room clock, so a delivery gap is told apart from corruption. A poll's tally replays as feed state. The same bytes ride a MoQ event timeline, an HLS date range, a CMAF event message, a data channel and a recording. | An event's time is its author's claim: a verifier checks that one author's times never go back. Events are signed, not encrypted. | ||
| Composition: the layout of a room's participants (a grid with a featured tile, or a grid under a picture-in-picture window) is a pure integer function of a signed descriptor and the participant set at each instant, and the audio mix an integer function of decoded audio, so every sink composes the same rectangles locally. A server compositor signs a receipt naming its inputs, which anyone checks against the same function. | The layout fixes rectangles, not pixels: how a renderer scales a source into its rectangle is its own. | ||
| Media over QUIC Transport, drafts 23, 22, 18 and 16, in the open-standards repository: a codec for each draft, whose every decoder is bounded and every refusal typed, the draft chosen per session before its first byte; a relay that reads the client's SETUP before it sends its own, holds every session to stated limits, and fans each object out in priority order over native QUIC, WebTransport and a WebSocket binding, forwards the receipts of the objects it drops, and admits a room grant only beside a proof of its key; a room service that issues grants and signs the room's lifecycle on its clock; and a browser client that publishes a camera and microphone, checks every object against its receipt before it decodes it, and composes the room with the integer layout. | Drafts do not interoperate with each other, so a session is one draft from its first byte to its last; the relay maps drafts 23, 18 and 16 onto draft 22's model and names what one draft can say and another cannot, and the extension's envelopes, receipts and catalog fields are the same on each. Runs against other implementations' relays and clients are recorded, with their date and every result, in the codec's README. The browser client speaks draft 22 unless a page asks it for draft 23, and the public room reaches its relay over the WebSocket binding. | ||
| Ingest and egress for standard encoders and players: WHIP into a room's tracks through a gateway that admits a publisher by its room grant, carries each frame as one envelope on a MoQ track, places it on the room clock within a stated bound and signs every group's receipts as the first hop; and WHEP out of them, every object verified against its receipt before a player gets it. | — | ||
| Capture binding: a device's full-quality master recording bound to the room while it is captured. The device commits to its master in the room's event track as it records; after the session it uploads the master by content address under the store's signed receipts, and signs a take manifest that lists every commitment and each subject's consent, a guardian's for a minor. A verifier gives single-take, aligned, complete and publishable for each purpose their verdicts. | A take commits to its bytes, whatever codec and container they hold. Its C2PA live video provenance is the live provenance extension's, which writes it. | ||
| Live provenance: the live video provenance of C2PA 2.4 section 19, written as that section defines it, for a room's CMAF tracks and a device's CMAF take. A room track packaged as CMAF travels under draft-ietf-moq-cmsf-01, each MoQ group one segment and each object one chunk, so a segment's C2PA hard binding and its group's receipt commit to the same bytes. Both methods: a manifest per segment that names its group's receipt, and Verifiable Segment Info signed by a session key that also signs the group's receipts; a take uses both, with its device's key. Every manifest carries the IPTC digital source type and an AI disclosure for each model the stream's label names, and a stream labelled machine-made without them is refused. Manifest identifiers derive from the stream and the segment and every signature is Ed25519, so packagers that share a key write the same segment and packagers that do not chain across a failover. An initialization manifest may carry a repository receipt of inclusion in a transparency log. | The reference implementation uses no C2PA library. An independent C2PA validator accepts the corpus's initialization segments. | ||
| Recording: a finished room session as one package (the room, each principal's whole event chain, each participant's take and optionally the composite) under a signed recording manifest, with verdicts for complete and publishable. A clip, a span of one take or a window of several aligned on the room clock, carries a range proof against a commitment the device made while it captured, so a verifier knows the clip's bytes are exactly those of the take, without the take. | — | ||
| Seeking back in a live room: a relay keeps a window of a room's tracks with their receipts, for at most a day and within a byte budget, evicting a group together with its receipts, and answers a MoQ fetch from it in the order asked, so a viewer checks a recorded object as it checks a live one. A fetch below a track's live edge is served only to a grant with the seek power; what the window evicted is marked as unknown, never as absent. It withholds what a moderation decision restricts, keeps nothing of an end-to-end encrypted room, and checks every object it kept against its receipt again after a restart. A hop that keeps a window states what it stored and served in its metering record. | The public demonstration room keeps a fifteen-minute window. | ||
| Timed text and live captions: cues in the styling WebVTT and the IMSC1 Text Profile both hold, mapped exactly onto each, onto the MoQ caption timelines and HLS, and onto CTA-608 by the decoder rules 47 CFR 79.101 reproduces, with a named refusal where a target cannot hold a cue. A live caption is a caption event, revised in place until it is final, and its origin (typed by a person, made by a machine, or made and reviewed, with the model's digest) is a disclosure label every mapping carries. | — | ||
| Metering: a hop that carried a room session signs one record of what it carried and dropped, its subscribers' time by layer class, its own energy with its acquisition class and a ledger of the grants its sessions ran under. The room-session receipt states the session's units, every hop's joules with its class and a total per class, never one across classes, and each grant's use against its ceilings; a verifier recomputes every number from the records. | The reference relay signs its record with the unmetered marker. Prices, billing and holding a ceiling while a session runs are the deployment's. | ||
| Energy-aware content steering: an operator's signed policy names the pathways, their hops and their quality and latency limits; a steering server derives each pathway's joules per delivered byte from the hops' signed records, compares figures only within one acquisition class, never ranks a pathway whose energy is not known above one whose energy is, and signs a decision that anyone holding the records recomputes. Its output is the steering manifest HLS and DASH players already read. | A steering server's network service is described only by its inputs and its output. | ||
| Moderation: a review policy signed by the room authority says which event kinds and media are held for review before delivery or reviewed after it, by whom, each deadline and the fallback when no decision arrives. A moderator's verdict is a decision event with a statement of its basis, its ground and its use of automated means; decisions on one item form a line, so an appeal's outcome is a decision too. Anyone can sign a notice about an item. A restricted item is withheld, never replaced, and its absence from a chain, a recording or a clip is explained by the decisions that restrict it. Each restricting decision maps onto one statement of reasons under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Article 24(5). | How a moderator or a classifier reaches a verdict, and how a notice reaches the room authority, are outside the text. | ||
| End-to-end encrypted rooms in the browser: a page is a member as any other, the reference member, sealed objects and codec built for WebAssembly as one module the page loads for such a room alone, every key in the page's memory and nowhere else. It seals each encoded frame before its receipt is signed over the sealed bytes, and opens each object before a decoder sees it. The reference room service carries a room's MLS messages in one log, in the order its clock took them, and a member applies a commit it made only when the log returns it. | — | ||
| Ad breaks from a room's cues: the room authority signs an ad policy naming the grant its ad decider runs under. Each break, from the room's signed cue events, maps onto one HLS interstitial date range and one DASH alternative-presentation event, so every edge writes the same playlist and MPD bytes and both stay shared and cacheable; a post-roll ends the program. Each viewer is decided behind the asset list the break names, filled by wai.video.ssai's decision and sealed in a receipt of its break form, and a verifier recomputes the decision, the asset list and the spend against the decider grant's funds ceiling. | The DASH mapping is read from the sixth edition's schema and its examples. | ||
| Ad presentation: a player's signed claim that it presented one impression of a break, naming the creative's media objects it presented by content hash and spans of media time with the least fraction of the ad's pixels in view and whether it was audible, optionally with a Privacy Pass token bound to that one impression. It is signed by a key made for the playback session, from which the session the receipt names is derived. A policy can require a claim for each impression under a stated viewability rule; the spend held to the decider grant's ceiling then counts only the impressions whose claim verifies. | Without attestation a claim cannot show that the player was unmodified, and an attested device running modified software still signs; the text says what each bounds. The reference producer, a span recorder over a video element with the claim's writer and signer, is in the browser client. | ||
| Ads run by the reference room service: the room's own source cues each break on its signed events track, the service stitches each session's breaks on signed records from cue to receipt, its sound composed at the same breaks as its picture, decides each impression by the room's invalid-traffic rules, and seals each break's receipt once the break has ended and its claims' grace period has passed. Every ad path it serves, from a viewer's session, binding and claim to the asset lists, the creatives and the operator's records, is described in its OpenAPI document and in the toolchain's operation catalogue. | The reference service fills a break from fixture creatives cut from a package. | ||
| Forensic watermark sessions: the edge that chooses each segment's A or B variant for a viewer, as ETSI TS 104 002 has an edge choose it, signs a session record when the session ends: the room and the content, the span, the content keys the variants were encrypted under, the TS's watermark token by its digest, the variant at each position, and a salted commitment to the session's grant and principal. A recovered variant sequence matches the one session that agrees with it at every position it states. For that session alone the room authority signs a disclosure that opens the commitment, which a third party checks, learning nothing of other sessions. | Lane A only: an end-to-end encrypted room has no edge that can mark it, and a record for one is refused. The matching rule has no tolerance and no threshold, since the TS leaves detection's statistics to its implementers, and the token's MAC or signature is the edge's to check. | ||
| Co-performance: people and AI participants performing together in a room, and an audience joining in. A participant announces the material it means to play next (an object by digest, notes, a text line or a camera move), and a room key's fidelity statement says how many of each participant's intents were kept, which a verifier recomputes. A turn schedule gives the floor in microseconds or in bars at a stated tempo; the relay refuses, or the room clock marks, an object published out of turn, and an object later than its grant's latency budget is marked, never mixed unmarked. An audience's inputs go to a window whose rule (a plurality vote, the top inputs by reactions, or a draw from a seed committed before any input) the clock commits to and selects under, with a credit for every pick. | — | ||
| Access services: a caption track's latency, stability and accuracy, each defined in integer arithmetic over its signed revisions, so any verifier recomputes a stated figure; audio description as a signed script with the ducking of the programme audio and its voicing, each labelled human or machine, mapped onto a DAPT document; sign language bound, object by object, to the final caption revisions it translates; and a claim that a session's access tracks are present, finished and within the tolerances it states. | — | ||
| Age assurance: a rating claim rates an object, a track, a span or a room under one or more rating schemes side by side, each named by its vocabulary URI, and is carried through every derivation, never dropped or lowered; a rating that rises for a span holds from the span's first group. A room's age policy names Privacy Pass issuers with one key per age threshold, so a token says only that its holder is at or over that age, and a relay, or the room's service over HTTP, admits by it and learns only the threshold and the issuer. On a bearer with no return path the sink evaluates the rating against a credential it holds, and nothing leaves the device. An admission receipt counts admissions per threshold, issuer and window, with every count under 50 suppressed. A room in which a minor publishes is never recorded, a relay keeps no DVR window of it, and no one who only watches sends chat or reactions. | Where a regime asks for a lawful basis, the operator states it. Its scope over MoQ follows an Internet-Draft, which may still change. |
Receipts, provenance and energy
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Group receipts: a content hash per object, a Merkle root per group, an Ed25519 publisher signature and a link to the previous receipt, chained per publisher key and track. | — | ||
| Typed receipt classes — delivery, energy, lawful-basis, log-inclusion, stage, delivery-gap, session, consumption, transmission and reconciliation — with an independent verifier and differential tests. | — | ||
| A relay cannot splice, replay or hold back a track's receipts unnoticed: a link without a signature is held to a strictly increasing signed group id, and a gap of any length fills in any order under the freshness bound. | — | ||
| Verified by inclusion: an object receipt checked against its group's root without the object's bytes, never read as delivered; a relay forwards the receipts of objects it does not forward. | — | ||
| Per-class decode receipts (video, film, world, score, haptics, 4D splats) that separate recomputable fields from the attested energy figure. | — | ||
| OER/2 receipts, with independent implementations including a C kernel. | The C kernel's energy meter is modelled. | ||
| C2PA manifest emission binding energy and reconstruction. | An optional build feature. The manifest validates; signer trust comes from the verifier's trust list. | ||
| Reconstruction binding, and a soft binding: a receipt reached through a soft binding attests the ancestor, never the object in hand. | A lossy re-encode breaks the hard binding; the soft binding is the path back. | ||
| Asset provenance steps. | The demonstration asset is synthesised. | ||
| Energy acquisition classes: CalibratedInstrument and OnChipCounter (each with a declared uncertainty), ModelBased, or Estimator, signed beside the figure in an energy claim, as a label on decode receipts, bound into an object receipt's leaf with its figure, and on a group total as the class its objects compose to. HwShunt is legacy: accepted in receipts sealed before the refinement, never emitted. | Unmetered work carries no figure and reads as not metered. | ||
| Energy meters: a hardware counter meter that yields OnChipCounter, or CalibratedInstrument with a calibration reference; a model meter that only ever yields ModelBased. | A meter that cannot measure returns no figure; it never falls back to a fabricated one. |
Confidentiality and rights
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| End-to-end encrypted rooms: the room authority signs a record that a room is end-to-end encrypted, with which ciphersuites, and that it is never recorded. Each publisher seals every object of its media tracks as an MoQ secure object (SFrame on an MoQ object), so relays route, cache, meter and sign receipts for ciphertext alone. The keys come from one MLS group per room, whose credentials are the principals' room keys and whose membership follows the room's grants and lifecycle: a principal that leaves, or whose grant is revoked or ends, holds none of the next epoch's keys. A receiver refuses, each with a named reason, an object it may not open. The reference implementation, its corpus and an independent verifier are in the open-standards repository. | Members run natively in the reference crates and, built for WebAssembly, in a browser page, and the reference room service carries a room's MLS messages. Events, catalogs and receipts stay in the clear. The secure-objects and MLS keying texts it follows are Internet-Drafts, the keying one an individual draft, which may still change. The construction the specification named before this revision is withdrawn. | ||
| Protected content in two lanes. Hardware-protected content decodes inside the platform's protected media path, and WAI attests about it only through its records (the manifest served, the segment map, key-release and ad decisions, what aired, and the content hash of each WAI object), none of which covers a decoded frame. Content encrypted end to end at the application layer is decrypted by the application, so a capability's tier and the output digests its sink states hold as they do for plaintext. | Encryption at the application layer keeps content from relays and from anyone outside the group, not from a member's device: it is not a protected-path robustness level. | ||
| Transparency (an external receipt encoding and transparency-service registration), log-inclusion claims, and task fidelity. | A log-inclusion claim carries the log's evidence verbatim; accepting the claim is not verifying the inclusion. |
Provenance and attribution
What a piece of media is, who made and directed it, whose works conditioned it, the uses its owners allow, and its removal.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synthesis provenance: an origin claim says of an object, a group or a track that it is captured, reconstructed, assistive or synthesized, names each input by the link hash of the input's own claim, and takes the greatest class of its step's and its inputs', so the class rises along every chain of derivations and never falls. The IPTC digital source type and the C2PA actions and AI disclosures follow from the claim. An assistive step that is one of the pinned integer derivations is proved by recomputing it; any other is asserted. A second marking layer, a watermark whose payload is the claim's class and the head of its link hash, is recomputed from the unmarked frames and read with no key. An AI participant in a room is marked as one, a review certifies one exact reconstruction for every viewer of it, and a label policy holds a player's signed log of the labels it showed. | The watermark claims to survive only the attacks a stated battery measured; it claims no crop and no small rotation. | ||
| Contribution records: a tool signs a session naming its people, each countersigning its own membership, and its models by digest, and every act as a signed step in a hash chain. Re-executing the steps gives, for every pixel of the output, whose act produced its value and whose choices conditioned it, as exact sample counts per party; a sample from a step whose mapping is unknown or undisclosed is never credited to anyone. A verifier checks that an edit changed nothing outside its region, that a selection is a member of its committed set and each candidate regenerates from its seed, and that each transform recomputes. One C2PA actions statement is computed per session. | WAI decides no legal question: the record states facts a reader applies its own rule to. | ||
| Direction records: a director, a person named by a key, signs a storyboard (the shots, their durations, subjects by reference picture, and framing), keyframes (each subject's box, size, position and angle, and a camera window, with a pinned interpolation between keys), regions held to a reference picture, and a sequence (which shots, which frames of each, in which order, cut or dissolved). The tool that made the video signs the layout of every frame as made. Under replicate every frame is recomputed by a pinned integer render, so each cut, duration, order, transition, framing and held region is checked exactly; under attest the same checks run on the tool's stated layout. A map states, frame by frame, who directed it at each level. | WAI decides no legal question. A float generator's frames are attested, and refused if claimed exact. | ||
| Influence attribution: an owner publishes a work (a style or reference image, a voice model, an adapter, a taste prior or a catalogue of works) with signed terms: the uses it allows, a per-use price or a revenue share, and the evidence a use must reach. A conditioning record names every work that conditioned a generation, with its owner's terms, its weight and its use, and a pinned conditioned generator lets a verifier regenerate the step, so a work left out, added or reweighted fails. The output is divided among the people who made samples, the owners of the works by their weights and the model's owner, and unknown and undisclosed shares are never credited. A settlement statement's attribution lines pay each owner from the output's acknowledged deliveries, and a signed report lets each owner recompute its amounts. | A training-time estimate is stated beside the shares, with its estimator's class, and never added to them. | ||
| Exploration and declared taste: six integer descriptors place a generated picture. An archive asks the exact generator for many pictures that differ, by a pinned schedule from a declared search seed, and replays bit for bit, so an elite dropped or chosen after the fact is refused. A work's distance from what the model makes by default is a signed measurement for the exact generator, an estimate for any other, and unknown, with no figure, never 0. A taste prior is an integer ranking model signed by its owner and carrying the owner's usage statement, and every archive, ranking and pick that an aesthetic or reward model steered names it or states none. | The corpus's taste priors are written in code with hand-set weights; nothing is trained on anyone's choices. | ||
| AI usage preferences bound to the bytes: a usage statement carries three published vocabularies verbatim, draft-ietf-aipref-vocab-08, the TDM Reservation Protocol and the training and data mining assertion (version 1.1), and adds no category to any of them. In an envelope's manifest the object's receipt signs it with the content, so an object whose statement is removed or altered no longer verifies. A room states its preference in a signed record, and a grant carries one principal's terms. HTTP origins and MoQ catalogs state it from the signed statement. An agent that consumed media signs a consumption claim naming the objects and the term it acted under, which a verifier checks against their statements, and a relay or gateway may require such claims before it serves an agent. | A refusal is of the use: the claim stays its signer's statement. | ||
| Takedown: a service signs the removal of a source (an object, a group, a track or a take) in answer to a signed notice or order, or of its own initiative. The takedown covers the source's derivation closure, computed exactly and transitively from derivation records and origin claims; a perceptual match is a class of its own, never counted as exact. Every party that held a covered object signs a purge, and the verifier computes the time to removal against the regime's clock, read by identifier from a registry of clocks that cites each instrument and provision. A service's signed counts recompute from its takedowns. The reference relay's DVR store honours a signed takedown. | A copy made outside every WAI derivation is out of reach. WAI decides no legal question. |
Accounts and their records
What a service that holds an account changed, handed over and deleted, each checkable by the account's holder without the service.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit chain: an account's log of who may do what, kept by the service that holds the account. Each entry states that an actor took an action on a target at an instant and names the entry before it by its link, a SHA-256 over its canonical form, so an entry changed, removed, reordered or brought from another chain breaks the chain. The keeper signs a checkpoint over the head at an interval and at every export; an export is checked alone, and an earlier checkpoint held to a later export shows the chain was only appended to between the two. | An account, an actor and a target are opaque identifiers: what an operator records, and who may act, are the operator's. | ||
| Data export: an account's records as one bundle of JSON Lines, signed whole by the service that held them, so the account's holder can show what it was handed: no record left out, changed or added, and in which order. Each record is named by its kind from one registry of record kinds and carried as its issuer wrote it, and the account's audit chain travels in the bundle, held to its own rules. The command-line tool verifies a bundle (wai verify). | A hosted service's own records, of kinds WAI does not define, travel beside a bundle, not in it. | ||
| Data deletion: a service's signed record of what it deleted of a subject's records and what it kept and why, checked against the final export the subject holds rather than taken on the service's word. The records are stated in classes, each deleted or kept, by its count and an RFC 6962 tree hash over the sorted digests of its records; a kept class states its reason and when it ends. The record names the keys destroyed, each other party that held the records, citing its takedown purges where it signed them, and when the last backup that may hold any of them expires. A verifier holds every exported record to exactly one class. | WAI decides no legal question and sets no rule on what a service must delete or may keep. |
Browser and portability
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser sink: parses and packs envelopes and runs the integer decoders. | — | ||
| Routing in a web page: for each object a page builds a capability report and routes it to the browser's own decoder, a native host's or WAI's WebAssembly decoder. The browser is asked, through isConfigSupported and Media Capabilities, only about codec strings the WebCodecs Codec Registry lists, and its decoder is taken only where it is exact for the tier the object needs, after a probe against published frame digests where that tier is decode-equivalence. The page evaluates capability constraint sets itself, and reports a measured energy figure with its acquisition class beside Media Capabilities' powerEfficient, which stays the browser's word; a decode with no measurement is unmetered, never 0 J. Every frame the page decodes carries a content binding: the content hash of the receipted object it came from, the link hash of the group receipt that object verified under, and the tier its samples hold. | The binding survives clone(), serialization and transfer, gives nothing to the bytes copyTo() writes, and does not survive a re-encode. A page keeps the binding in a side table keyed by decoder and timestamp. | ||
| Native and browser builds produce the same output for the integer-exact capabilities. | Checked in the page, per frame, with a 64-bit FNV-1a hash; receipts use BLAKE3. | ||
| A C interface over the reference implementation: it builds as a shared and a static library (libwai) with a generated header, include/wai.h, to pack, unpack and select from envelopes and to read an integer payload's declared cost. | Built by the ffi feature, which a default build turns on. Without the codec libraries, CI builds it with --no-default-features --features ffi and runs its envelope tests. | ||
| Reach builds of the browser sink for engines the shipped build does not reach, derived from the shipped package with no change to its code: its JavaScript interface legalised for engines that cannot exchange 64-bit integers, the binary lowered to the first WebAssembly version, and a translation to ES5 JavaScript, the last two in four profiles, from the whole module down to receipts alone. An ES5 loader picks one by feature probes alone. Each gives the shipped build's outputs byte for byte. | Checked in CI on server builds of engine lines back to 2014, which stand in for device classes. | ||
| The verifier module: WAI's verifiers as one WebAssembly module for wasm32-unknown-unknown, with a versioned interface that needs no generated glue, so a page, a console or a native host runs the same checks with the same bytes and states which ones it ran. Its operations are WAI's verifiers of records defined elsewhere, among them OER/2 chains, decode and package receipts, receipt-ledger documents and accounts' audit chains, each the code its own corpus is checked with. Its recipe makes the module's bytes a function of its sources alone; a module of record is pinned by its SHA-256, and every build is held to the module's corpus and to the records' independent verifiers. | — |
Parameter-set pin and component identity
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| The model pin is normative: one SHA-256 over a whole parameter set, a set of several files pinned through its listing, a closed determinism vocabulary and an informative predecessor link. A sink verifies the pin before it decodes and decodes only from the bytes it verified. | A pin that does not resolve makes its capability unsupported for that envelope: dispatch continues at the fallback, and selection at the next rendition. | ||
| Component identity in multi-rendition envelopes: each entry may carry an id, a payload digest and its pin, and a companion names its base by id. | — | ||
| One dispatch rule on every selection path: candidates, companion-only capabilities, records and derivations are never dispatched. | — |
Staged delivery
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| A base first and refinements as separate objects, each linked to its base by hash, for images, video, audio and 3D splats. Every stage carries a stated determinism tier, and a missing or refused refinement leaves the base intact. | — | ||
| Layers that arrive out of order are held within a bound; two different layers for the same unit freeze it at the output it already shows; over an attested base, a layer counts only against verified delivery. | — | ||
| A sink bounds the work and memory of every base and every layer, of the whole chain and of what it keeps for bases it has dropped, and refuses past each bound before decoding. | — | ||
| The same sink compiled to WebAssembly: a browser rebuilds every stage of the corpus, and every stage hash equals the native sink's. A base the page supplies, rather than one the sink decoded, is marked as claimed in every result built on it. | — | ||
| Refinement layers over Media over QUIC: each layer its own track with its own receipts track, so a subscriber caps layers and receipts together; a lost receipt is fetched back, a subscriber states a finite hold and re-anchors past it, and a subscriber can join mid-stream. | The binding follows the Media over QUIC Internet-Drafts it names, which may still change. | ||
| Stage claims: a sink signs the stage it presented for each unit, the stage delivery reached and each refinement object's fate, checked unit by unit; a relay signs what it did not forward. The reference sink states its own claim, and every corpus case replays through it. | — | ||
| The residual refinement payload, refinement entries in multi-rendition envelopes, a command-line tool, and a corpus with an independent verifier. | — |
Measuring staged delivery
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bytes per stage counted only in a format WAI checks, with the same parse a sink runs; identical segments counted once; anything else is named as not countable. | — | ||
| Quality per stage in integers, alike on every target: squared error, PSNR and an SSIM that covers every pixel, with its overflow bound stated. | — | ||
| Every base decoded by the reference sink under a stated cost limit, and each title's outputs committed as a tree whose claim states the root and the leaf count. | — | ||
| A simulator that replays a delivery plan through the reference sink, and a bound on how long a refinement can stall its base, proved under its stated preconditions. | Outside its preconditions the simulator reports no bound. | ||
| The signed session claim: what a sink presented when, what arrived and what was missed, bound both ways to the stage claims it names; checked against the envelopes it names, so each presentation is of an object, a layer and a unit that envelope gives, through a decoder a sink would dispatch; an energy figure only with its class, which a key without the energy authority cannot confirm. | Timings, missed deadlines and switches remain the signer's statements, as do the facts of an encrypted envelope that only its payload shows. | ||
| Measurement and the session claim in the browser: the reference measurement code, compiled to WebAssembly, gives the native tool's figures byte for byte, and a page records, seals and verifies a session claim that the native and independent verifiers accept. | — | ||
| Delivery telemetry: player and server reports that point at receipts by hash and never restate an energy figure, and never carry a URL query, a fragment or credentials. | — |
HTTP delivery
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAI objects over HTTP, served as application/vnd.wai, named by their content hash and immutable, with a codecs parameter that lists what a variant may dispatch to and its floor beside it. A reader takes application/wai, the name earlier revisions and the tools released from them wrote, as the deprecated alias of application/vnd.wai; a producer never sends it. | — | ||
| A head proof: a client checks an envelope's head against its content hash before it fetches the rest, and checks its length separately. | — | ||
| Byte-range fetch of one rendition from a multi-rendition envelope, picked exactly as whole-envelope selection picks and checked by its digest, with the whole object as the fallback. | — | ||
| A refinement never holds up its base: the base is presented as it verifies, refinements are fetched apart and dropped when they fail or are late, and a layer object is fetched whole and checked. | — | ||
| Cache rules, with a public driver that checks a cache against them and negative controls it must catch. | — | ||
| Playlists: one HLS and one DASH renderer for every packager; the classical master names nothing of WAI, and a class master adds one session-data line at one stated position. | — | ||
| Playlists sealed in a receipt, verified strictly: a live client follows the chain through revisions it skipped, re-anchors past a stated bound, and refuses a revision that rebinds a URL or a sequence number to other bytes. | — | ||
| A DASH reader whose memory is bounded by the document, and an adjacency check against the classical MPD. | — | ||
| Rendition switching in integers, within stated bounds and computed exactly; under a joule budget the choice is never raised. | — | ||
| Receipts, key logs, key statuses, grants and parameter sets served over HTTP and checked on every fetch path. A receipt file is refused unless its link hash is its name; a receipt index leads a client by hash to an object's group receipts, the claims about it and their parents, each checked on its own. A key log anchors an origin only when the verifier retrieved it from that origin over TLS itself, and a parameter set fetched by its digest is held only by its pin. | Every receipt file, index and fetch budget has a stated cap, and a client fetches at most 64 parents for one group. An object the client did not receive is verified by inclusion, never as delivered. An energy claim over HTTP that names an OER receipt is refused. | ||
| Live HTTP egress: a room's CMAF tracks served while the room is live as low-latency HLS, one part per object with preload hints, blocking playlist reload and delta updates, and as low-latency DASH, whose segments are sent as they grow. The egress subscribes as any subscriber does and holds each object once its bytes verify against its group's signed receipts or, while the group still grows, against a running receipt its owner signed for that object; nothing is written ahead of a request. Every part is served beside its receipts and its run, every playlist and MPD carries a statement signed under a key the owner delegates, a protected track is served as it is by an egress that holds no key, its playlists stating its protection, and a room's breaks carry through. | Statements beside the playlists are signed by the egress's delegated key; the media keep the owner's receipts. | ||
| HLS windows and clips: a holder of a classical HLS presentation of fragmented MPEG-4 segments signs a window revision each time the window it keeps for seeking back changes (a segment admitted, one evicted, the stream ended), each segment by its SHA-256 and length, each revision linked to the one before. A clip, a span of the window as an on-demand playlist, carries a signed record of every segment it presents and the revision it was cut from. Both playlists are rendered from their records by one rendering, so a verifier renders the playlist and compares the bytes, and holds a clip to the window it was cut from. | — |
Integer codecs: payloads and operators
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Each integer codec carries a pinned binary payload: video, learned image, audio and 3D splats. A malformed payload is refused with one of a closed list of reasons, in one stated order, alike on every target. The payloads and parameter sets of integer synthesis and of the integer MLIC++ codec are written down beside them. | — | ||
| The integer operator set every integer-exact capability decodes through: each operator's exact integer arithmetic, a range rule on every tensor, two accumulator profiles, static bounds rules with a canonical bounds certificate that decides which profile a parameter set meets, a graph form, and canonical lowerings of the existing integer network forms to it. A reference crate that runs the bounds pass and writes the certificate, conformance vectors, a certificate for each committed parameter set it lowers, and an independent checker and certifier that shares no code with the crate and recomputes every vector and certificate byte for byte. | A Draft extension. The reference decoders of wai.neural.int_synth, wai.neural.int_hyper, wai.video.int_hyper, wai.audio.int_codec, wai.splat.int_codec and wai.neural.int_mlicpp decode through it, as do wai.image.jpegai's integer stages: its scale path and entropy decodes on both of its reference decode paths, and its integer networks on its exact decoder. wai.video.int_motion, the P-frames of wai.video.int_hyper and the integer refinement payloads run through its stage operators alone, with no graph. An operator implementation of its wai-ops/1-i32 subset for GPUs, at both accumulator profiles, is in the repository; the determinism tiers extension lists where it reproduced the vectors. | ||
| An integer decode path that needs no machine-learning runtime, and every emit path checks a payload the way a sink does. | — | ||
| A sink reads a payload's exact output size, working memory and compute from its header before it decodes, and can refuse by its own limit. | The header bounds the work; a small payload may describe a large output, and a sink applies its own size policy before decoding. |
Packaging
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| A packaging policy, read from bytes in three stages with every refusal named, and digested over its canonical form, so two spellings of one policy have one digest. | — | ||
| Sources read without trusting their headers, and pieces cut at scene changes by a streaming segmenter that looks ahead, so a flash or a cut back does not start a piece. | — | ||
| One integer video encoder that writes the pinned video payload, with motion search, closed-loop quantisation and a stated working-memory bound; the step for each piece is chosen under the policy's distortion bound. | — | ||
| Packages: a stage index and a signed package receipt bound to the policy it was packed under, a floor checked against its keyframe plan, and HLS, DASH and Media over QUIC views of one package. | The reference packager packs one video component with a supplied floor. It refuses by name, before it writes anything, another medium and a floor it would have to encode. | ||
| Staged packages: each piece coded in the rungs of its ladder, which a rule may choose; refinement layers over a piece's integer base, each applied by the reference sink before it is kept, with every prefix's tier, digest, squared error and deadline in the stage index; and stills, a piece's first frame held for the piece as a PNG every byte of which is stated. | — | ||
| Live windows: a source packed as it arrives, its pieces gathered into windows, each sealed by a package receipt chained to the previous window's. Its bases and refinements are the on-demand package's, byte for byte. | The live packer writes no floor: a supplied floor is made from the whole source, so it is the on-demand package's. | ||
| Delivery simulated over what a live packer publishes and what a class subscribes to: each refinement track's own delivery timeout, the stated priorities, the subscriber's layer cap, and group receipts on each track's chain. | Its figures are labelled simulated, with their plan, and are never a measurement of a network. | ||
| A package verifier that refuses, never panics: a package that is not its policy's, a floor that opens on a non-key frame, a receipt in non-canonical form, and any file or directory outside the listing. | — | ||
| A conformance corpus that an independent implementation re-derives: policies, sources, scene cuts, every motion vector and residual of the golden payloads, the choice of step, and every refinement layer and still, byte for byte. | — | ||
| A package played in the browser: by default every piece travels as the standard codestream, AV1 inside a WAI object, and an integer lane rebuilds every piece byte for byte; the sink checks every object against the stage index and every rebuilt frame against the native reference, and refuses a mismatch and plays the piece's other rendition, beside a classical ladder of the same excerpt. | One open-film excerpt at 256 × 128. Bytes, quality and decode time are measured in the tab. |
Energy reports and what receipts cover
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Measurement and operating-point claims report on an energy figure without changing the receipt that seals it; ratios and verdicts are derived by every reader, never stated. | — | ||
| A power reader counts only while it is live: a rail that stops advancing is refused, never sealed under a hardware class. Unmetered work is never a figure of zero joules. | — | ||
| A receipt object's figure, class and origin are bound into its Merkle leaf, and a labelled group signs its total's class, its coverage and the parent link. | — | ||
| Energy methods: WAI's signed energy records mapped onto the methods the media and ICT industry uses to measure and report energy and emissions, method by method, with energy per viewing hour and per gigabyte delivered defined exactly, carbon entering only through a signed location-based factor table the operator supplies, and a signed export of each method's report form in which every figure names the records it rests on. | A field no WAI record supplies is stated as not supplied, with the reason, never estimated; a partial total is marked partial, and figures of different classes are never summed. |
Keys, signing authority and revocation
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| A signer names a web origin that publishes a key log: revisions under a root key that pre-commits to its successor, each key's authorities, and its status. Verifiers confirm receipts, claims and module grants against it offline. | — | ||
| Decoder and reconstruct modules, and pinned parameter sets, are authorised by digest and revoked by digest. A sink that holds a key log refuses a revoked parameter set, and its dispatch falls back. | — | ||
| One rule for every Ed25519 signature WAI defines: the key is its point's one canonical encoding and not of small order, R is not of small order, S is below the group order, and the cofactorless equation holds. One verifier in the reference implementation and one in the independent verifier apply it, and each receipt family's corpus carries the signatures a verifier checking only the equation would accept. | OER/2 keeps the signature rule its own extension settles, and the quantum toolkit's receipts have a verifier of their own. |
Certification
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certification: what a certifier publishes when it runs another party's build against WAI's conformance corpora. Every suite the submission declares is run whole, each run a signed conformance result, and the submission is certified only when every run passes. A submission that did not pass gets a signed refusal naming the run that did not pass, or the limit or the forbidden call that stopped it. A signed manifest lists every file of the publication by its SHA-256, and a relying party checks a whole publication offline against the corpora it holds; a key statement lets a key of the certifier's service the relying party already holds state the certification key. | — |
Registry and public text
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Every registered string in one table with its kind, status, media class and registering section; a machine-readable export and vocabulary v2 are generated from it and checked for drift in CI. | — | ||
| The wai command-line tool lists the registry (wai capabilities) and writes its machine-readable export (wai registry export); CI checks the committed export through it. | — | ||
| Candidate capabilities, whose payload format is not pinned, are never emitted or dispatched. | — | ||
| Security notes: how to report a vulnerability, and where the reference implementation reads untrusted input and what it bounds there. The reader is fuzzed with coverage guidance every night: the envelope readers, the integer payload decoders against every committed parameter set, the picture, audio, video and text decoders, and the extension containers. CI checks that every section the notes cite exists. | — | ||
| The codec glossary is linked to the registry and held to its schema by a test. | — | ||
| The browser sink builds for wasm32 in CI. | — |
Continuous integration
Each workflow shows its current status on the forge.
| Capability | Notes | Where | Conformance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Byte equality of the integer decode paths on macOS arm64, Linux x86-64 and Linux arm64. | — | ||
| Conformance corpora, fast-kernel equivalence (audio and splat included), the OER C kernel and C2PA isolation. | — | ||
| Headline decode tests that fail on a missing input, with CI supplying inputs pinned by digest. | — | ||
| Neural end-to-end decode runs in CI. | — |
The live relay behind the shared-world demonstration is a companion implementation, reached through a WebSocket bridge. It lives outside the open-standards repository and carries its own licence. The live room's relay, room service and client are the reference implementations in the repository.
Why it is built this way
The sink is a computer, so every hop does work: the encoder splits and chooses, the edge selects without rewriting, and the sink rebuilds and proves.